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Do Managers Influence their Pay? Evidence from stock price  
reversals around executive option grants 
 
ABSTRACT 
Using a database of 605,106 option grant filings by insiders between 1992 and 2002, we find 
significant abnormal stock return reversals around the grant date. Consistent with the 
hypothesis that managers influence their pay, the reversals are positively related to grant size 
and the seniority of the manager, and negatively related to the firm size. The reversals are also 
more pronounced for grants that are not awarded on a regular schedule. The returns following 
the grant date are negatively correlated to the returns prior to the grant date, indicating that 
some firms are attempting to influence the grant date stock price by more than just timing the 
grant date or timing information releases around the grant date. We find that the extent of 
reversals are positively related to the magnitude of the time interval between the grant date and 
the date the grants are reported to the SEC, suggesting that some firms are setting the grant date 
on a back-date basis, i.e., picking a date in the past with a lower stock price compared to that on 
the decision date. 
 
1. Introduction 
The subject of executive compensation has attracted considerable attention recently from 
academics, the general public, as well as several regulatory and law enforcement agencies. 
While several aspects of executive compensation have been subjected to careful scrutiny, 
executive stock options have garnered the lion’s share of the publicity, mainly because of the 
explosion of option grants which increased nine-fold between 1992 and 2000 (Hall and Murphy 
(2003)).  
A standard feature of executive stock options is the uniformity of their design. Murphy and 
Hall (2002) finds that 94 percent of the options to CEOs of S&P 500 companies in 1998 were 
granted at-the-money. The exercise price of these options is set to the stock price on the grant 
date. Both academics and investor advocates have pointed out recently that such at-the-money 
options offer managers the opportunity to enhance the value of their option grants through 
strategic timing. Bebchuk and Fried (2004), for example, argue that executive compensation 
setting is not an arms-length transaction and that senior executives have the power to influence 
the grant day stock price, and hence the exercise price of the options, in their favor by 
controlling both the timing of the grants and the timing of corporate information disclosures. 
Patrick McGurn, senior vice-president at Institutional Shareholder Services, a proxy-voting 
firm that advises institutional investors, is quoted as saying that the concern is that companies 
are gaming the process and managing the information flow to put options out at the best 
possible time for (executives).1 In fact, it was recently reported that the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) is investigating whether some companies have been granting 
stock options to executives just before releasing market-moving information that boosts stock 
price (see Solomon (2004) and Morgenson (2004)). 
                                                 
1 See Solomon (2004). 
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In this paper, we investigate the hypothesis that managers reap a windfall by influencing 
the exercise price of their stock option grants using a comprehensive database that includes 
605,106 option grants reported by insiders receiving the grants during 1992 – 2002. This data 
set is compiled from the filings insiders are required to make to meet the disclosure 
requirements of Section 16(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Figure 1 offers some 
preliminary evidence regarding managerial influence of the exercise price of their option 
grants. The figure plots the cumulative average raw and value-weighted market-adjusted stock 
returns (details of the calculations are provided in a subsequent section) of the firms in our 
sample 90 trading days prior to and 90 days after the grant date (date 0). For the purposes of 
this figure, each option grant is treated as an event. As can be seen from the figure, the 
cumulative returns (both raw and market-adjusted) are negative prior to the grant date and 
positive subsequent to the grant date. The cumulative average raw return is −4.4% over the 
interval [−90, 0] and 8.7% over the interval (0, +90]. The corresponding cumulative average 
market-adjusted returns are −3.5% and 9.4%, respectively. As we show later, these returns are 
significantly different from zero. 
The evidence presented in Figure 1 is compelling: the lowest average stock price during 
the period of 180 days straddling the grant date occurs exactly on the grant date. One reason 
this result is compelling is that the grant date is usually not publicly known when it is set. The 
earliest any information about the grant date and grant details can be obtained by investors is 
either from company proxy statements which are usually filed about three months after the 
fiscal year of the option award, or from the filings of insiders who, for most of our sample 
period, were required to disclose option grants within 10 days of the month following the 
month of the grant.2 Moreover, there is hardly any investor reaction at all when the option 
grants are actually made public. This essentially rules out investor reaction to grant 
                                                 
2 While firms are not required to report the grant dates, many voluntarily disclose this information; even if they do 
not, one can infer the grant date from other reported option characteristics. 
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announcements as the reason for stock price behavior around the grant date, leaving the 
possibility that the evidence in Figure 1 is a result of managerial influence of the stock price on 
the grant date. 
Our comprehensive data yield several important new findings consistent with the 
influence hypothesis. The abnormal stock return reversals on the grant date are (a) positively 
related to the size of the grant, suggesting that managers who have more at stake are more 
likely to attempt to influence the grant date stock price; (b) negatively related to firm size as 
measured by market capitalization, suggesting that the practice is more prevalent in firms with 
weaker corporate governance and investor scrutiny; (c) more pronounced when the grants are 
made to top executives such as CEOs and CFOs as opposed to more junior executives, 
consistent with the managerial power hypothesis as more senior executives have the ability and 
information to influence the stock price; and, (d) more pronounced in the case of grants not 
awarded on a regular schedule which allow managers greater flexibility to time the grant date 
to take advantage of stock return variations. We also find that stock returns during the 10 days 
following the grant date are negatively correlated to the stock returns 10 days prior to the grant 
date, suggesting sharp reversals of stock returns and that some of the grants are indeed made 
when the stock price is at its lowest.  
Previous researchers have suggested that firms might be timing the release of 
information around scheduled grant dates and timing unscheduled grant dates around release of 
information to reap a windfall from their option grants by lowering the exercise price. While 
the evidence in our paper is also consistent with such influencing behavior, it is rather 
surprising that some executives are able to influence the stock price so precisely that the lowest 
stock price in a 181-day window occurs on the grant date. In order to do this, executives have 
to release unfavorable news before the grant date and then provide favorable news or reverse 
the earlier unfavorable news after the grant. We offer another explanation for the stock return 
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reversals in Figure 1: that grant dates are set on a “back-date” basis, that is, in many cases, the 
lowest stock price during a window is picked as the grant date ex-post. While it is difficult to 
provide direct support to the hypothesis that the back-date method is used to influence the grant 
date stock price, we offer corroborating evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis. 
The evidence consistent with the back-date method of influencing the grant date stock 
price comes from the relationship between stock price reversals on the grant date and reporting 
lags. As stated earlier, for most of our sample period, Section 16(a) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act requires that option grants be disclosed within 10 days of the month following 
the month of the grant. About two-thirds of the awards in our database are reported after this 
deadline.  We define the number of days elapsed between the grant date and the reporting date 
the “reporting lag.” If indeed in some cases the grant date is set on a back-date basis, the 
reporting period is extended automatically by an amount equal to the elapsed time between the 
reported grant date and the date on which the grant decision was made. Therefore, if the stock 
return reversals of Figure 1 are caused partly by awards being given on a back-date basis, the 
reversals should be more pronounced (i.e., the drop before and the rise after the grant date 
should both be steeper) in those cases where the reporting lag is greater. This is exactly what 
we find.  
Several studies (Yermack (1997), Aboody and Kasznik (2000), Chauvin and Shenoy 
(2000), and Lie (2004)) have investigated the stock price behavior around CEO option grant 
dates based on data from company proxy statements. Our data on option grants is more 
comprehensive than all of the previous studies as it covers not only a longer period of 11 years 
but also the period during which both the number and size of option grants increased 
dramatically. Our data also includes all insiders (not just CEOs) who are required to disclose 
option grants. The extended (and recent) time period covered and the comprehensiveness of the 
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data enable us to conduct a more detailed investigation and, thereby, provide a much stronger 
support for the influence hypothesis. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the implications of the 
influence hypothesis in general and explores the implications of the back-date method. Section 
3 describes the data and provides the summary statistics. Section 4 reports the stock price 
performance around grant dates and compares our results with previous results. Section 5 
explores the determinants of the abnormal stock return reversals around the grant date. Section 
6 investigates the implications of the back-date method of influencing the stock price. Section 7 
explores alternative hypotheses that might explain the stock return reversals around the grant 
date. Section 8 concludes. 
2. The influence hypothesis and its implications 
 Incentive compensation contracts for top managers have long been considered a 
solution to agency problems between managers and shareholders. This view is being 
challenged recently by both practitioners and researchers who claim that while compensation 
contracts may provide some alignment of the interests of managers and shareholders, they 
create their own set of agency problems (see Crystal (1991), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000), 
and Bebchuk (2004)). They argue that agency problems arise in incentive compensation 
primarily because of the power managers can potentially exert over corporate boards that are 
responsible for setting their pay. Such power enables managers to influence their own 
compensation contracts and extract rents because boards have been presumably ineffectual in 
their oversight of managers.3 It is also likely that boards and compensation committees are 
sympathetic to managers and are influenced by them. Influencing compensation might also 
                                                 
3 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) find evidence consistent with CEOs having captured the pay-setting process 
and show that such “skimming” is less in better-governed firms. 
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occur with the covert approval of the board if it holds the view that the manager deserves more 
compensation.  
One of the most popular forms of executive pay for the last decade or so has been stock 
options. While managers may use their power to influence boards to award them more stock 
options, a subtler way of enhancing their compensation is to influence the option parameters, in 
particular, the exercise price. It is a well-documented fact that an overwhelming majority of 
executive stock options are granted at the money with the exercise price set at the stock price 
on the grant date. Even in cases where out-of-the-money options are granted, the grant date 
stock price is used as the benchmark in setting the exercise price.4 If the number of options to 
be granted is fixed, managers receiving the options benefit from any temporary drop in stock 
price just before the grant date. Boards might find it expedient to allow managers to receive the 
additional compensation through such camouflaged means as influencing the stock price, rather 
than increase the size of the option award, in order to avoid public shareholder outrage.5 The 
stock return reversals on the grant date reported in Figure 1 are consistent with the hypothesis 
that some managers attempt to increase the value of their option compensation by influencing 
the stock price of their option grants.  
a. Methods employed to influence the stock price 
If one holds the view that influencing leads to rent extraction by managers, knowing the 
channels through which managers influence the stock price will enable shareholders, boards, 
                                                 
4 There are two possible reasons why in-the-money options are not typically granted. First, FASB rules prevailing 
during our sample period require that the difference between the stock price and the exercise price of in-the-money 
options be charged against earnings. Second, in-the-money options are not considered “performance-based 
compensation” under Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code and therefore are not deductible if an 
executive’s total nonperformance-based compensation exceeds $1 million a year. 
5 Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (1996) find evidence that camouflaging executive pay is the reason companies 
oppose expensing of executive stock options. As tighter disclosure requirements increase the scrutiny of executive 
pay, ‘stealth’ compensation has shifted to other components of compensation such as post-retirement benefits, 
deferred compensation, below-market rate loans, etc (see, for example, Lublin (2002)). 
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and regulators to understand and, hence, prevent or mitigate the problem by streamlining the 
pay-setting process and requiring enhanced disclosures. One can conceive of three methods 
through which the stock price on the grant date can be influenced. While the employment of 
two of these methods to influence the stock price has been investigated in earlier work by 
Yermack (1997) and Aboody and Kasznik (2000), not much attention has been paid to the third 
channel of influence. 
The first method applies to grants that are awarded on a regular schedule. Many 
companies award options on a regular schedule, approximately at the same time each year 
(“scheduled awards”). Since managers know the grant date in advance, they can influence their 
pay by managing the release of information around the grant date so that the stock price is at a 
temporary low on that date. In particular, managers can influence the stock price by delaying 
the release of good news after the grant date and advancing the announcement of bad news 
before the grant date. Aboody and Kasznik (2000) find evidence that is consistent with CEOs 
timing the release of earnings information. They find that analyst forecasts, largely based on 
guidance provided by management, are less optimistically biased during the three months prior 
to scheduled awards when compared to forecasts issued for the same firms during other 
months. They also find that CEOs who receive their grants prior to an earnings announcement 
(when they have an informational advantage and can therefore influence the stock price) are 
more likely to issue negative forecasts, and less likely to issue positive forecasts, when 
compared to CEOs who receive their grants after the announcement. Baker, Collins, and 
Reitenga (2003) find more direct evidence that managers may be manipulating stock prices 
through reported earnings. They find that managers who receive large option awards appear to 
make income-decreasing accrual choices when public earnings announcements are made before 
option grant dates.  
The second method of influencing the stock price applies to unscheduled awards. 
Managers can influence the grant date stock price by timing the grant date such that the stock 
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price is lower on that date. The grant date can be set after the announcement of bad news (and 
the resultant drop in the stock price) or before the announcement of a good news (and the 
resultant expected rise in the stock price). Obviously, it is not possible to influence the stock 
price on the grant date in this manner for scheduled grants. The empirical evidence is 
suggestive of grant date timing by managers. Yermack (1997) finds positive abnormal stock 
returns following the grant date (but no significant abnormal returns prior to the grant date) in a 
sample that contains both scheduled and unscheduled CEO awards. He also finds that CEOs 
receive stock option awards in advance of good earnings news. Similar evidence consistent 
with stock price influencing through managing information release is also found in the case of 
repriced options.6 Callaghan, Saly, and Subramaniam (2004) find that repricing dates precede 
the release of positive earnings announcements and follow the release of negative earnings 
announcements. Since their sample does not separate repricings done on scheduled option 
award dates from those on unscheduled dates, their result should be interpreted as consistent 
with either of the two methods of influencing (timing of earnings announcement or timing of 
repricing dates). A similar interpretation is appropriate for Yermack’s results as well since his 
sample also does not differentiate between scheduled and unscheduled awards. 
The third method by which managers might influence the exercise of their option grant 
that is consistent with stock return reversals around the grant rate is by the ex-post timing of the 
grant date. In other words, some managers, or some compensation committees, might select the 
grant date as a date in the recent past at which the stock price was lower than that on the day 
they actually made the compensation decision. We call this the ‘back-date’ method of 
influencing the exercise price. If managers pick a date at which the stock price was a local 
                                                 
6 Options are typically repriced when they are deep in-the-money following severe stock price declines. While 
repricings may involve changes in exercise price and/or changes in maturity, only repricings involving changes in 
exercise price are reported since SEC disclosure rules do not seem to apply to just changes in maturity. Brenner, 
Sundaram, and Yermack (2000) report that the new exercise price is lowered to the stock price on the repricing 
date in 79% of their sample while it is lowered to a price greater than the stock price on the repricing date in about 
19% of their sample. 
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minimum, we call this aggressive back-dating. There is no SEC regulation that we are aware of 
that is violated by setting the grant date on a back-date basis.7 While the grant date is clearly 
specified in proxy statements, it is generally difficult to determine the date when the grant date 
was decided.  
In order to determine the importance of each of these channels of influence, we develop 
implications of the three methods below. 
b. Implications of different methods of influencing the grant date stock price 
The timing of both the earnings information release and the grant date requires that 
managers possess private information and pick the appropriate time to release it. In the case of 
timing the release of earnings information, the evidence presented earlier indicates that it is 
prevalent in the case of scheduled grants.8 Managers may receive good or bad news ahead of 
the scheduled grant date. When the news is favorable, presumably they delay it till after the 
grant date; if the news is unfavorable, they release it before the grant date. If managers behaved 
in this manner, the stock return behavior around the grant date reported in Figure 1 will be the 
aggregation of two independent sets of stock return patterns around the grant date. For grants 
that followed the receipt of favorable news by managers (but released after the grant date) the 
CAR before the grant date should be not significantly different from zero while the CAR 
following the grant date should be significantly positive. In contrast, for grants that followed 
the receipt of unfavorable news by managers (and released before the grant date) the CAR 
before the grant date should be significantly negative while the CAR following the grant date 
                                                 
7 The only regulation that specifies what a grant date is (to our knowledge) is Section 1.421-1 of Internal Revenue 
Code. It states that “…‘the date of the granting of the option’ and ‘the time such option is granted,’ and similar 
phrases refer to the date or time when the granting corporation completes the corporate action constituting an offer 
of stock for sale to an individual under the terms and conditions of a statutory option. A corporate action 
constituting an offer of stock for sale is not considered complete until the date on which the maximum number of 
shares that can be purchased under the option and the minimum option price are fixed or determinable.  




should not be significantly from zero. The same argument holds if managers are timing the 
grant date instead of release of earnings information: the stock return behavior around the grant 
date in Figure 1 will be the aggregation of two independent sets of stock return patterns around 
the grant date.  
One might argue that the stock return reversals in Figure 1 could very well be the result 
of managers first releasing bad news to drive the share price down and then releasing good 
news to reverse the trend. While such managed reversals are possible in theory, in practice it 
seems unlikely for a variety of reasons. First, it is difficult to conceive of sufficiently large 
number of instances when both good and bad news arrive in a short interval prior to the grant 
date to allow managers to selectively release the news to influence the stock price. In addition, 
attempts to first decrease the stock price and then to raise it after ten days might easily attract 
regulatory scrutiny. For instance, if managers attempt to drive the share price down before the 
grant date by selling shares of the firm that they own and then release favorable earnings 
information after the grant date, it will be most likely in violation of the anti-fraud provisions of 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 [Section 10(b)-5]. For these reasons, it appears 
farfetched that managers are influencing the stock price with such precision to obtain options at 
a reduced exercise price.  
Thus, if there is a negative correlation between the stock returns before and after the 
grant date, it implies that managers are using other channel(s) in addition to timing of earnings 
announcements and grant dates to influence the stock price. If managers are employing the 
back-date method aggressively by picking the date in the recent past at which the stock price 
reached a minimum on the grant date, then by definition, there will be negative returns before 
the grant date and positive returns after the grant date. Consequently, we should expect to 
observe a negative correlation between stock returns before and after the grant date.  
An implication that is unique to the back-date method of setting the grant date involves 
the reporting lag, i.e., the number of days between the grant date and the date on which the SEC 
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received the insider’s filing to meet the disclosure requirements of Section 16(a). If the grant 
date is decided on a back-date basis, the reporting lag is the sum of two time intervals: the 
interval between the grant date on record and the decision date (the day when the grant date 
was decided), and the interval between the decision date and the date when the SEC receives 
the filing. Note that the first interval will be zero if the grant date on record coincides with the 
decision date. Therefore, if there is no backdating, the reporting lag is just the time interval 
between the decision date (which is also the grant date on record) and the date when the SEC 
receives the filing. However, if the grant date is set using back-dating in order to influence 
managerial compensation, the reporting lag will increase as the grant and decision dates 
diverge. Therefore, if some firms are retroactively choosing the grant date of the options, then 
the stock price reversals around the grant date should be positively related to the reporting lag.9 
Lie (2004) also conjectures that some firms may be using the back-date method to pick 
the grant date and offers as evidence negative predicted stock returns prior to the grant date and 
positive predicted stock returns after the grant date of unscheduled awards. Based on the 
paper’s premise that executives do not possess the ability to forecast future market-wide 
movements that drive these predicted returns, the paper concludes that the results suggest that 
at least some of the awards are timed retroactively.10 We argue here that the premise on which 
the conclusion is based is inconsistent with empirical evidence. Seyhun (1988, 1992, 1998), 
and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) show that managers do exhibit the ability to forecast future 
market returns. In further support of this point, we examined 1,316,204 trades by corporate 
                                                 
9 Our argument implicitly assumes that the time managers take to report the grant to the SEC is independent of 
whether the grant date is set on a back-date basis or not. The manner in which the grant date is set, though, might 
affect the reporting strategy of the manager. Even if setting the grant date on a back-date basis may not violate the 
letter of the regulation, it may be viewed as violating its spirit, which in turn might induce managers to speed up 
the reporting. If managers behave in this manner, there may be a weaker relation between the reporting lag and the 
stock return reversals, even when the grant date is set retroactively. Such a behavior would work against our tests 
and would bias our findings toward detecting no relation.  
10 Lie states “Unless executives possess an extraordinary ability to forecast the future market-wide movements that 
drive these predicted returns, the results suggest that at least some of the awards are timed retroactively.” 
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managers in their own firms’ stock between 1975 and 2000. Using a three-day holding period 
around managers’ stock sales, market returns (a value-weighted index of New York Stock 
Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ stocks) declined from 0.4% for the three-
days before the sale, to 0.2% for the three-days after the sale. This evidence suggests that 
insider sales imply less positive market returns in a very short time period. For three-day 
holding periods around managers’ purchases, market returns increased from 0.07% to 0.22% 
which suggests that insider purchases imply more positive market returns in a very short time 
period. Using a 30-day window further strengthens these results: market returns declined from 
3.00% to 1.98% for sales and increased from 1.21% to 2.06% for purchases.11 These results 
seem to indicate that managers have some ability to predict market returns. The ability of 
managers to forecast the market returns most likely arises from the fact that some of the signals 
managers observe in their own firms are actually due to movements in market-wide factors. 
Managers typically are not able to distinguish the source of these signals and trade as if these 
signals are mostly due to firm-specific factors. This behavior causes managers’ stock trades in 
their own firms to ‘forecast’ the market-wide factors. Therefore, Lie’s premise is violated and 
additional evidence is needed to support the back-date hypothesis. 
In this paper, we offer more direct tests consistent with the back-date method of 
influencing option-based compensation. In particular, we investigate if the positive abnormal 
return following the grant date is correlated with the negative abnormal return before the grant 
date, a result that is inconsistent with timing of both earnings releases and the grant date and 
implies that other methods of influencing might be at work. We follow up by investigating 
whether the extent of stock return reversals is positively related to the reporting lag.  
                                                 
11 All differences are statistically significant at the 1%-level. 
 
 13
3. Data and summary statistics 
The disclosure of changes in the equity holdings of beneficial owners (defined as 
director, officer, beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of equity securities) is 
governed by Section 16(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The disclosure rules 
were amended in 1991, requiring beneficial owners to report derivative transactions separately 
from equity transactions. Thus, starting in 1992, data is available on all option grants to 
executives and directors of companies that fall under the purview of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934. Until recently, Section 16(a) of the Act required beneficial owners to 
disclose their option awards within the ten calendar days following the end of the month in 
which the options were granted. On August 27, 2002, in line with Section 403 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, the SEC amended the disclosure rules for beneficiary ownership reports to 
be filed under Section 16(a) to be reported electronically within two business days of getting 
notification of the grant. 
The option grants data in the study is obtained from a compilation by the SEC of the 
filings to meet Section 16(a) requirements. The data contains all option grants made by publicly 
traded firms in the eleven years between January 1992 and December 2002. Since we need 
stock market data for analysis, data on stock market returns are obtained from CRSP. The final 
sample contains 605,106 option grants between January 1992 and December 2002 in firms for 
which stock return data is available in CRSP. Thus most of our sample pre-dates the 
accelerated reporting requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics regarding the number of option grants, the 
average grant size in terms of underlying shares, the number of firms granting options, and the 
average number of options granted per firm in each year of our sample. It can be seen that the 
number of firms granting options increased dramatically starting from 1996, more than 
quadrupling from the previous year. It is also interesting to note that the number of firms 
granting options has reduced by about one-third in the final 5 years of the sample, dropping 
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from a peak of 4690 firms in 1998 to 3343 firms in 2001. A similar pattern is observed in the 
grant volume: from a peak of 2.94 billion shares in 1999, to 1.97 billion shares in 2001.12 The 
increase in the number of grants with the simultaneous decrease in the underlying shares per 
grant between 1999 and 2001 indicates that increasingly options have been used to compensate 
lower level executives as well.  
Table 2 summarizes the award characteristics across different firm size groups and 
seniority of insiders receiving the awards. In Panel A, firms are classified into four groups 
based on their market capitalization at the end of the calendar year prior to the year the option 
award was granted (less than $100 million, $100 million to $500 million, $500 million to $3 
billion, and greater than $3 billion). If we ignore the lowest size category, the average 
underlying shares per grant and per firm, and the total shares granted increase with firm size. It 
is possible that young firms are overrepresented in the lowest size category which explains why 
the average underlying shares per grant and firm and the total number grants are greater for this 
group than the next higher size group. The average maturity of option grants is greatest for the 
largest size category and averages in the range of 7.65 – 8.55 years across firm size groups with 
an overall average of 8.11 years.13  
The average time to first exercisable date (often called the vesting period) increases 
monotonically with firm size, ranging between 1.84 and 2.20 years across firm size groups with 
an overall average of 1.98 years. The final column of Panel A provides the time lag between 
the grant date and the date the SEC receives executives’ disclosure forms. It is interesting to 
note that this lag shows a wide variation ranging between 129 – 224 days and is monotonically 
                                                 
12 The number of grants and the number of shares granted fall further in 2002. However, since the data set was 
obtained in early 2003, the data for 2002 are understated significantly because of late reporting (up to 6 months on 
average), shown next. 
13 Murphy (1999) reports that 83% of the option awards made by his sample of 1,000 large companies (on the 
basis of market capitalization) in 1992 had a maturity of 10 years, while another 13% had maturities less than ten 
years and 4% had maturities exceeding ten years. We find that the average maturity of the option award is 9.85 
years if we limit the sample to first-time awards. The lower average maturity of options for the entire sample is 
due to the lower maturity of options in the subsequent years of a multi-year compensation plan started earlier. 
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decreasing in firm size. More significantly, it appears that executives do not report by the 
reporting deadline on average. Since the regulation before Sarbanes-Oxley Act required 
executives to report within the first 10 calendars days of the month following the grant date, 
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act required reporting within 2 days of the grant, we should expect a 
reporting lag of no more than 40 days if there was full compliance. As Table 2 shows, however, 
the overall average reporting lag is 170 days.  
Panel B of Table 2 divides the sample on the basis of the insiders’ seniority, classifying 
those with the titles (on the grant date) of Chief Executive Officers (CEO), Chairmen of the 
Board (CB), Chief Financial Officers (CFO), Presidents (P), Officer-Directors (OD, H), as “top 
executives” and separating this group from all others in the sample. About 22% of the option 
grants in our sample were top executives. This group of executives clearly has substantial 
decision making authority and access to company-specific information. Moreover, they have 
the ability to manage the disclosure of information to investors. It can be seen from Panel B 
that top executives are on average given much bigger option grants than other executives. The 
average number of shares received by top executives per grant is about 2.5 times that received 
by other executives (49,630 shares versus 19,071 shares). The average maturities of options 
granted to top executives and others are not significantly different though the vesting periods of 
grants to top executives is slightly shorter (1.78 years versus 2.01 years for others). Finally, top 
executives appear more in violation of SEC reporting requirements: they report their grants to 
the SEC with a greater average lag than other executives (192 days versus 169 days for others). 
4. Stock price reversals around option grant dates 
The next set of evidence we present consistent with the hypothesis that managers reap a 
windfall by influencing the exercise price of at-the-money stock option grants is the stock price 
behavior around the grant date. As stated earlier, the grant date is usually unknown to investors 
until the details of the option grant is reported by either the company or the executives 
 
 16
receiving the grant. Companies usually report option grants in proxy statements typically issued 
several months after the grant. Executives deemed as insiders are required to report option 
grants by the end of the tenth day of the month following the award, which implies an average 
reporting lag of about twenty days. In fact, the average reporting lag is as high as 170 days, as 
seen from Panel B of Table 2.14 Therefore, the null hypothesis is that stock prices exhibit no 
unusual behavior on the grant date.  
We measure stock return behavior using the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal daily 
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where  is the with-dividend return to stock i for day t, and  is the with-dividend return to 
value-weighted portfolio of all New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange and 
NASDAQ stocks for day t. The mean raw returns, and the mean and median CAR are reported 
for holding periods [  for 
tir . tmr ,
]0,−T −T  = −10, −20, −30, −40, −50, and −90, and for holding periods 
 for ],1[ +T +T  = +10, +20, +30, +40, +50, and +90 in Table 3. Figure 1 plots the mean CAR 
and the mean raw returns. For all summary statistics and figures, the unit of observation is the 
individual grant and, therefore, all means and medians are computed across all 605,106 
grants.15 We compute the raw returns because it could be argued that in the short-term market 
movements are less important in influencing the exercise price of the option grant. It can be 
seen from Table 3 that the mean and median CAR are negative and decreasing for all holding 
periods prior to the grant date and positive and increasing for all holding periods subsequent to 
the grant date. The raw returns follow a similar pattern. Standard errors of returns are computed 
by averaging all returns across all events and then taking into account serial correlation of 
average abnormal returns. Consequently, we do not assume either cross-sectional independence 
                                                 
14 Even in cases in which the grant dates are known in advance because the companies have a fixed award 
schedule, the grant dates should reveal no information as the details of the award are not known.  
15 As explained later, we group all grants by one firm on a given day as a single event for regression analysis. 
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or time-series independence of the residuals.  As indicated by the p-values in Table 3, all 
returns are significantly different from zero. The differences between adjacent holding periods 
(unreported) are also significant for all three variables. These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that managers influence the exercise price of their option grants.  
Table 3 indicates that the mean CAR for 90 days prior to the grant date is −3.26% and 
90 days subsequent to the grant date is 8.85%. The corresponding raw returns are −2.40% and 
9.59%, respectively. While these results are somewhat similar to that obtained by previous 
researchers (Yermack (1997) and Aboody and Kasznik (2000), for example) they differ 
significantly in two important dimensions. Yermack (1997) and Aboody and Kasznik (2000) 
find no significant abnormal returns prior to option grants while we find a significant negative 
return.16 The magnitude of the stock returns is also substantially different. Yermack (1997) 
finds a 100-day abnormal return following the grant date of 2.56% and Aboody and Kasznik 
(2000) report a 30-day abnormal return of 1.67% following the grant date.17 By contrast, the 
mean CAR in Table 3 for the holding period of [1, 90] is 8.85% and for the holding period of 
[1, 30] is 6.12%.  
We attribute these differences to several factors. First, the sample period covered by 
both these papers is short (1992-94 by Yermack (1997) and 1992-96 by Aboody and Kasznik 
(2000)) while our sample period extends from 1992 to 2002. As can be seen from Table 1, the 
bulk of the option grants were made after 1995. Second, the number of firms in our sample is 
significantly greater (more than 5,000 firms compared to 500 firms in Yermack (1997) and 
1,304 firms in Aboody and Kasznik (2000)). In particular, the earlier studies have focused on 
larger firms while we include all firms. As we show later, the stock price behavior exhibited in 
                                                 
16 Aboody and Kasznik (2000) find a significant negative abnormal return for 30 days preceding the option grant 
date (−1.78%) for their sub sample of unscheduled awards.  
17 Yermack (1997) computes abnormal returns using a market model while Aboody and Kasznik (2000) use the 
same method as in our paper. 
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Figure 1 is much stronger for smaller firms. Finally, their results are based only on CEO awards 
while our database includes all managerial awards.18 
In order to check the consistency of our results with that of earlier studies, we 
investigated the stock price behavior around option grants over different time periods. Figure 2 
shows the stock price behavior for the sub-periods of 1992-94, 1995-96, and 1997-2002. The 
magnitude of the mean CAR following the option grant is much lower and more in line with 
that of earlier studies. The 90-day mean CAR following the grant date is about 4.4% during the 
1992-94 sub-period, and the 30-day mean CAR following the grant date is about 4.19% for the 
1995-96 sub-period. These figures are still greater than the corresponding from the previous 
papers, and the differences are probably due to the presence of smaller firms in our sample. The 
mean CAR twenty days prior to the grant date is not significantly different from zero during the 
1992-94 sub-period, as reported in Yermack (1997). Overall, it appears that our results are 
consistent with that of earlier studies for the time periods covered by those studies.  
Table 4 presents the frequency of abnormal stock return reversals (ASRR) on the grant 
dates and compares it to ASRR on randomly chosen dates for the same firms. To qualify as an 
ASRR, both the CAR in the interval [−9, 0] and the CAR in the interval [1, 10] should exceed 
specified thresholds. We use three different definitions of ASRR based on three threshold 
returns (±0%, ±2%, and ±5%) for both the pre-grant and post-grant CAR. For example, to 
qualify as an ASRR with a threshold of ±2%, the CAR in the interval [−9, 0] must be less than 
−2% and the CAR in the interval [1, 10] must be greater than or equal to +2%.   
It can be seen from Panel A of Table 4 that the frequencies of ASRR for the whole 
sample are 0.318, 0.241, and 0.150 for thresholds ±0%, ±2%, and ±5%, respectively. These 
frequencies of ASRR are substantially greater than the corresponding expected values of 0.257, 
0.139 and 0.057 from randomly chosen dates for the same firms. We have also bootstrapped the 
                                                 
18 Our results are generally in line with those of Lie (2004) whose data covers only CEO awards during the same 
period as ours. He finds a CAR of approximately −2.5% prior to the grant date and +2.5% after the grant date.  
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significance of these differences by randomly generating 1,000 samples of 605,106 random 
dates using a uniform distribution across all dates with valid stock returns. The ASRR for the 
grant dates exceed their corresponding ASRR for random dates at the 0.001 level. The same 
pattern holds for all four size groups regardless of the threshold. 
Panel B of Table 4 presents the ASRR frequency for different industry groups, in 
ascending order of the ASRR frequency for the ±0% threshold. It can be seen that about 44% of 
the option grants in our sample come from two industry groups, technology and healthcare. The 
industry group with the highest frequency of ASRR is technology, which also leads in the 
number of options granted. If we use the ±0% threshold, the frequency of ASRR for the 
technology industry at 38% is significantly greater compared to the expected frequency of 
25.7% from randomly chosen dates in the same firms. The technology industry is not unique in 
this regard: as can be seen from the table, several industries exhibit significantly greater 
frequency of ASRR compared to the expected frequency. The only industry that does not 
exhibit any evidence of stock price influencing around the grant date is the public utility 
industry: the frequency of ASRR for this industry is effectively the same as the expected 
frequency based on randomly chosen dates. 
To summarize, in contrast to most of the previous evidence, we find abnormal stock 
return reversals around the option grant date. This pattern of stock price behavior is prima facie 
consistent with the influence hypothesis. In the two sections that follow, we provide more 
formal support for the influence hypothesis. 
5. Factors that affect stock return reversals 
Before we investigate the implications of the different methods of influencing the stock 
price on the grant date, we provide a brief discussion of some factors that affect the incentive 
and the ability to influence the stock price on the grant date and provide evidence on how the 
stock return reversals around the grant date are affected by these factors. 
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First and foremost, managerial influence of grant date stock price should be more 
pronounced for larger grants since greater potential benefits are at stake for the managers. 
Figure 3 presents the CAR around the grant date for five different groups based on grant size 
(less than 1,000 shares, 1,001 to 10,000 shares, 10,001 to 100,000 shares, 100,001 to 500,000 
shares, and greater than 500,000 shares). It can be seen that generally the stock return reversals 
are starker for larger grants. For the largest grants, the 90-day pre-grant date return is −7% and 
the 90-day post-grant date return is 12.7%. In fact, if firms are back-dating even by twenty 
days, it increases the manager’s compensation by 10% for the largest grants.19 
Secondly, the seniority of the manager receiving the grant should affect the stock return 
reversals. It is the senior-most managers who are better equipped to influence the stock price as 
they possess more company-specific information, have the ability to manage the disclosure of 
this information, and have greater decision-making authority. Moreover, top executives such as 
CEOs also wield greater power with the board as they usually play a major role in the 
appointment of board members, in the formation of the compensation committee, and 
sometimes even serve on their own compensation committees. In addition, given that the 
average size of top executives’ grants is likely to be significantly greater than that of other 
executives, their incentive to influence the stock price is also likely to be greater. For all these 
reasons, we expect a higher incidence of stock return reversals around grant dates involving top 
executives. Figure 4 presents the CAR around the grant date for top executives (Chief 
Executive Officers, Chairmen of the Board, Chief Financial Officers, Presidents, and Officer-
Directors) and others. As can be seen from the figure, the stock return reversal around the grant 
date is more pronounced when top executives are receiving the option grants. Both the fall in 
                                                 
19 We can get an approximate idea of the windfall from such back-dating by calculating the value of the average 
at-the-money option grant using the following parameters: average stock price = $30; risk-free rate = 5%; 
volatility = 30%; maturity = 8 years (from Table 2). This gives an option value of $14 which translates to $7 




stock price before the grant date and the subsequent rise are more pronounced in the case of top 
executives. 
Under the influence hypothesis, the third factor that is likely to affect the stock return 
behavior around the grant date is the firm size. Managers of smaller firms are more likely to 
engage in influencing behavior because smaller firms are likely to be subject to less scrutiny 
than larger firms, as evidenced by the fact that they have less analyst coverage (see Bhushan 
(1989) and Lang and Lundholm (1993), for example), and have lower institutional ownership 
(see Gompers and Metrick (2000), for example) making it easier to influence the stock price. 
Smaller firms are also weaker on corporate governance and transparency (Durnev and Kim 
(2004)), and there is evidence that managers are more likely to capture the pay-setting process 
in firms with weaker governance (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001)). It is also well-
documented that managers in small firms are able to better exploit their informational 
advantage to earn larger profits on insider trades (Seyhun (1998)). Therefore, we should expect 
the stock return reversals around grant dates to be starker for smaller firms.  
Figure 5 presents the CAR around the grant date for four different firm size groups (less 
than $100 million, $100 million to $500 million, $500 million to $3 billion, and greater than $3 
billion) based on the market capitalization at the end of the calendar year prior to the one when 
the option award was granted. Evidence in Figure 5 suggests that the subsequent rise in stock 
price is strongly negatively related to firm size. In the smallest firm size group, the 90 day up-
drift is about 17%. In the largest firm size group, the 90 day up-drift is about 4%. Hence, 
managerial gain from subsequent stock price rise is inversely related to firm size which is 
consistent with our conjectures about corporate governance.   
Examining the pre-grant stock price behavior also provides some interesting insights. 
Stock prices decline (and thereby exhibit reversals) for the three larger firm size groups, but not 
for the smallest firm size group. Under the information disclosure channel, this evidence 
suggests that managers mostly postpone good news until after the option grant date. Under the 
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back-dating channel, this evidence suggests that managers choose a past date as the option 
grant date with a stock price that is lower than the current stock price. However, the lower 
stock price does not represent a local minimum. 
Finally, managers’ ability to influence the grant date stock price is somewhat limited for 
regularly scheduled awards. Managers can influence the stock price of scheduled awards only if 
they possess timely and relevant information before the scheduled date. They can then time the 
release of this information to their advantage (releasing favorable information after the grant 
date and unfavorable information before). However, their ability to time the grant date or 
employ the back-date method is limited in the case of scheduled awards. For example, if option 
awards are scheduled to be granted in a particular week of a given month, the extent of timing 
flexibility is limited to a week. By contrast, managers can influence the stock price around the 
grant date of unscheduled awards by simply timing the grant date (scheduling it just before the 
release of good news and just after the release of bad news) whenever they obtain material 
information that would affect the stock price, or by employing the back-date method. Since 
unscheduled awards provide managers who wish to influence the stock price more 
opportunities to do so, one would expect greater probability of reversals around unscheduled 
awards. We classify an option grant as a scheduled one if at least one manager has been granted 
options in the same calendar month the previous year. According to this classification, there 
193,275 scheduled and 411,831 unscheduled awards. Note that, with this definition, even 
scheduled grant dates may be timed (ex-ante or ex-post) over a range of 30 days. Figure 6 
presents the CAR around the grant date for both scheduled and unscheduled awards. It can be 
seen from the figure that only unscheduled awards exhibit abnormal stock return reversals 
around the grant date. While scheduled awards exhibit a positive return on average after the 
grant date, there is no drop in the stock price on average before the grant date. The stock return 
behavior reported in Figure 6 is consistent with the influence hypothesis. 
 
 23
Table 5 presents joint tests of the effects of the four variables discussed above on the 
probability of ASRR on the grant date by means of a probit analysis with the probability of the 
ASRR as the dependent variable. We use the same three thresholds for ASRR as before (±0%, 
±2%, and ±5%). To avoid counting option awards to different executives of the same firm on a 
given day as independent observations, all options awarded to executives of the same firm on a 
given day are grouped as a single grant. This adjustment reduces the number of observations to 
65,760 event dates.  
The independent variables are the four variables discussed above, namely grant volume, 
firm size, executive rank dummy (top executives = 1; others = 0), and schedule dummy 
(scheduled grants = 1, unscheduled = 0). If at least one manager has been granted options in the 
same calendar month the previous year, then the schedule dummy is set to one, otherwise, it 
equals zero. Since we are considering all grants on a given day by a firm as a single event, we 
need to redefine some of the independent variables to take into account this adjustment. The 
grant volume is now defined as total volume of grants to all executives of a firm on a given 
day. If at least one top executive of a firm receives an option grant on a given day, all grants by 
that executive’s firm on that day are classified as top executive grants (the definition of top 
executive is the same as before). If no top executive of a firm receives an option grant on a 
given day, all grants by that firm on that day are classified as received by other executives. 
Such a classification is consistent with the influence hypothesis that top executives are more 
likely to influence the exercise price: as long as at least one top executive receives an option 
grant, we can expect to see a stronger attempt to influence the exercise price.  
It can be seen from Table 5 that signs of coefficients for grant volume, firm size, rank 
dummy, and schedule dummy are as predicted and significant (p < 0.0001, from Wald  
statistics) for the ±0% threshold of ASRR, implying that the probability of ASRR increases 
with grant volume and executive seniority, decreases with firm size, and is greater for 




significant with p < 0.0001 for the other two thresholds of ASRR as well. The schedule dummy 
for the other two thresholds is significant at the 10% level. Overall, these results are consistent 
with the influence hypothesis. 
6. Evidence on the back-date method of influencing compensation 
The evidence presented above is consistent with the hypothesis that managers influence 
their compensation by influencing the exercise price of their option grants. We now explore 
more formally whether one of the channels employed to influence their compensation is the 
backdating of the grant date so as to minimize the exercise price of the options, thereby 
increasing the value of the options granted. As discussed in Section 2, if managers are 
influencing the grant date stock price through timing of the release of earnings information or 
timing the grant date, the stock price behavior around the grant date in Figure 1 should be the 
aggregation of two independent sets of stock price behavior patterns around the grant date and 
we should not observe any correlation between the cumulative abnormal returns before and 
after the grant date. Table 6 provides evidence of the relation between the stock price behavior 
before and after the grant date. The table provides the results of the regression with the CAR 
after the grant date as the dependent variable and the CAR before the grant date as independent 
variable, with the log of the shares granted, log of the firm size, and a dummy for the rank of 
the executive, and a dummy for scheduled awards as control variables. Results of nine 
regressions are reported, with CAR for three different time intervals after the grant date ([1, 
10], [1, 50], [1, 90]) as the dependent variable and CAR for three different time intervals before 
the grant date ([−90, −81], [−60, −51], [−10, −1]) as an independent variable. As in Table 5, we 
count all grants by a firm on a single date as a single observation for this regression and all 
variable definitions are as for Table 5.  
It can be seen that the coefficients of pre-grant CAR are statistically significant (p < 
0.0001) when the closest interval before the grant date, [−10, −1], is used as the independent 
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variable. The signs of these coefficients are consistent with Figure 1, indicating that greater pre-
grant stock price drops imply greater post-grant stock price rises. Several of the coefficients of 
pre-grant CAR are not significant when the other two intervals are used for past CAR. The 
contrast between the results for the closest pre-grant interval and others is stronger when the 
sample is limited to unscheduled awards (not reported). These results imply that, on average, 
firms whose stock prices drop just before the grant date are the ones that are likely to see their 
stock prices rise after the grant date. Such short-term reversals are highly unlikely under the 
information release hypothesis and would likely subject the executives to anti-fraud and price 
manipulation provisions of the securities laws. On the other hand, if some managers back-date 
aggressively (pick a minimum stock price in the past) then these short term reversals occur by 
necessity under the back-dating hypothesis. An implication of the evidence presented in Table 
6 is that, if managers are influencing the exercise price, at least some of them are employing 
methods other than the ones discussed above, i.e., timing the release of earnings information 
and timing the grant date to ensure that the grant date follows the release of unfavorable 
information or precedes the release of favorable information. As discussed in Section 2, if the 
back-date method is employed aggressively to pick the grant date, one would expect to observe 
a stock return reversal around the grant date as shown in Figure 1. Also, by definition, the use 
of the back-date method implies a greater reporting lag as discussed in Section 2. Moreover, if 
managers back-date aggressively, namely, try to find a past stock price that is a local minimum, 
they would in general need to go back further. The longer the time period over which they 
search the more likely that they will be able to pick a date in which stock price forms a local 
minimum. This implication follows directly from the properties of extreme statistics. Therefore, 
another implication of the back-date hypothesis is that there should be a positive relation 
between the probability of abnormal stock price reversals around the grant date and the 
reporting lag. Under the other two hypotheses, there is no reason to expect a positive relation 
between abnormal stock return reversals around the grant date and the reporting lags. 
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Table 7 provides the frequency of ASRR on the grant date for different reporting lags. 
In this table, each option grant is viewed as a separate event. The table divides the grants into 
three groups based on reporting lag: grants that are reported in 25 days or earlier, between 26 
and 125 days, and after 125 days. For each group, ASRR on the grant date is computed for each 
of the three threshold returns (±0%, ±2%, ±5%), as before. Results are reported for the entire 
sample and for the subsamples of scheduled and unscheduled grants. It can be seen from the 
table that, for the whole sample, the frequency of ASRR increases with reporting lag for all 
three thresholds, consistent with the back-date method of influencing compensation. We also 
estimated the significance of the differences in reporting lags using dummy variable 
regressions. The two greater reporting lag dummies are both significant at the 0.001 level. 
Hence, greater reporting lags are significantly associated with greater likelihood of abnormal 
stock return reversals. 
Table 7 also shows that the frequency of ASRR in the case of unscheduled awards is 
consistently higher than the corresponding figure for scheduled awards for all three thresholds. 
This is expected since the likelihood and extent of back-dating will be greater with unscheduled 
grants. If grants are regularly scheduled on a specific day, back-dating is impossible. Since our 
definition of scheduled grants includes grants scheduled in the same month as the previous 
year’s grants, the extent of back-dating is limited to a month in the scheduled awards 
subsample. It is also worth noting that while the frequency of ASRR monotonically increases 
with reporting lag in the subsample of unscheduled awards, this is not the case with the 
subsample of scheduled awards.  
The probit regressions reported in Table 8 provide more formal evidence of the 
relationship between the reporting lag and the stock price reversals on the grant date. Table 8 
repeats the probit analysis of Table 5 with the probability of an ASRR as the dependent 
variable and with the reporting lags added to the set of independent variables. We add two 
reporting lag dummies, with Report Lag2 dummy set to 1 if the reporting lag, measured in 
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calendar days, is in the interval [26, 125] and Report Lag3 dummy set to 1 if the reporting lag is 
greater than 125 calendar days. For reporting lag, we use the shortest of the reporting lags for 
option grants by a firm on a given day. Such a specification biases the analysis against finding 
any significance for reporting lags. We expect that if the public finds out about any of the 
grants on a given day, then they typically infer that others also might be getting options on the 
same day. We report the results for the whole sample with a schedule dummy (scheduled grants 
= 1, unscheduled = 0) and for the subsamples of scheduled (N = 14,369) and unscheduled (N = 
51,391) awards. All other variables are defined as in Table 5. It can be seen from Table 8 that 
all the variables are generally significant for the whole sample with the only exception being 
the schedule dummy for the ±2% threshold of ASRR. In particular, both reporting lag dummy 
coefficients have the predicted sign and are significant (p < 0.0001) for all three ASRR 
thresholds implying that the greater the reporting lag the greater the probability of a stock 
return reversal around the grant date. For the sample of unscheduled awards, both reporting lag 
dummy coefficients have the predicted sign and are significant (p < 0.0001) for all three ASRR 
thresholds While the reporting lag dummy coefficients have the predicted sign for the 
scheduled sample as well, they are not as significant. This result is consistent with the 
aggressive back-date method of setting the grant date.  
7. Alternative hypotheses 
Until now we have focused on the implications of the influence hypothesis. In this 
section we discuss some alternative hypotheses and the consistency of the previous section’s 
results with these hypotheses. To this end, we examine three alternative hypotheses, namely, 
better alignment of managers’ interest, insider trading hypothesis, and repricing hypothesis. 
An alternative explanation for the increase in stock price following the stock option 
awards is that investors expect managers to create value because of the better alignment of 
managers’ interests with those of shareholders resulting from increased option ownership. The 
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fact that the grant volume and executive seniority are directly related to the steepness of the 
stock price rise following the grant date is consistent with the alignment hypothesis as well, 
since one can argue that more grants increase the managers’ incentive to create value and that 
more senior executives have more control over decisions affecting firm value. The fact that the 
stock price rise following the grant date is steeper for unscheduled awards is also consistent 
with the alignment hypothesis. Since both the timing and the volume of grants are surprises in 
the case of unscheduled awards the stock price impact is greater than in the case of scheduled 
awards in which the only surprise is the volume of the grant. However, some of evidence 
presented in the previous section is inconsistent with the alignment hypothesis. The first 
inconsistent evidence concerns the timing of the stock price increase. As indicated earlier, 
information about the grant date is not released immediately. In fact, as Table 2 shows, the 
average reporting lag is 170 days. In addition to the reporting lag, there are dissemination lags 
by the SEC and the listing exchange. For most of the sample period, the dissemination lags are 
typically about a month [Seyhun (1998)]. Therefore, it is unlikely that investors are reacting 
favorably to option grants. As can be seen from Figure 7, the stock returns around the day SEC 
receives the filing do not exhibit stock return reversals. Hence, there is no obvious market 
reaction around the public release of managerial compensation information. This finding is 
inconsistent with the alignment hypothesis. The second empirical fact that the alignment 
hypothesis cannot explain is the relationship between the reporting lag and the stock price 
reversals.  
Another potential explanation for the observed stock price behavior on the grant date is 
that there are some insiders other than the executives receiving grants (such as compensation 
committee members) who know the grant date as soon as it is decided and their trading is 
causing the stock price to rise following the grant date. The implicit assumption behind this 
argument is that these insiders believe that other investors will view the information about the 
option award as favorable news. Therefore, using the same line of reasoning as in the case of 
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the alignment hypothesis, it follows that the results reported earlier involving grant volume, 
executive seniority, and award scheduling are consistent with the insider trading hypothesis as 
well. Insiders have to sell before the grant date to produce the pre-grant stock price drop and 
buy after the grant date to produce the subsequent stock price increase. However, Section 16-b 
of the Securities and Exchange Act in fact prohibits these types of short-swing profits (from 
selling high and buying low within 180 days). Therefore, insider trading hypothesis cannot 
explain the relationship between the reporting lag and the stock price reversals. 
Finally, executive stock options are sometimes repriced. This means that if the stock 
price drops substantially, firms can lower the exercise price of old options and/or cancel old 
options and issue new options. Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack (2000) report that the new 
exercise price is lowered to the stock price on the repricing date in 79% of their sample. 
Therefore, it is quite natural that stock prices would drop before the grant date of repriced 
options. The stock price might rise after the grant date if the market viewed the repricing as 
good news because it provides better incentives to the managers to create shareholder value. 
Indeed, Callaghan, Saly, and Subramaniam (2004) find negative abnormal stock returns before 
and positive abnormal stock returns after the repricing date. To test if our results are due to the 
presence of repriced options, we removed from our sample any observation which showed a 
stock price drop during one, two, or three-year period immediately before the 90 days prior to 
the option grant date. Our findings were unchanged. Using only options which showed stock 
priced increases during long periods prior to the option grants, we can still establish strong 
stock price reversals, a negative relation between 10-day returns before and after the grant date, 
and a positive relation between stock price reversals and reporting lags. 
In summary, it appears that these alternative hypotheses cannot satisfactorily explain 
our findings, including the stock return reversals in Figure 1, leaving us to conclude that the 




We analyze the extent of managerial influence on their compensation by using a 
comprehensive database of 605,106 option grants reported by all managers in all publicly listed 
companies during 1992-2002. Our overall evidence is consistent with substantial managerial 
influence on their compensation. Stock price fall significantly prior to option grant dates and 
rise significantly following option grant dates, thereby producing sharp reversals of abnormal 
returns. The market-adjusted return for the 90 days preceding the grant date is about −3.6% and 
the return for the 90 days following the grant date is about 9.4%. In small firms, the 90-day 
post-grant date average abnormal rise in stock price is about 17%. These patterns are 
significantly larger than any that has been documented in previous literature. 
We find that the abnormal stock return reversals are more pronounced for larger grants 
which increase the incentive to influence the grant date stock price. Managerial influence is 
also more pronounced on average for smaller firms that are likely to be subject to less investor 
scrutiny and are also likely to be weaker in corporate governance and transparency. The 
abnormal stock return reversals are more pronounced on average when the grants involve top 
executives such as CEOs, Chairmen of the Board, Presidents, and CFOs, who possess more 
company specific information, have the ability to manage information disclosure, and wield 
greater influence with the board. Finally, abnormal stock return reversals are greater for 
unscheduled grants as it gives managers more flexibility in setting the grant date.  
The abnormal stock return reversals are found in most industries with the technology 
industry leading the list. The frequency of abnormal stock return reversals on option grant dates 
in this industry is about 38%, which is significantly greater than the expected frequency of 
reversals of 25.7% based on randomly chosen dates for the same firms. The public utility 
industry is the only industry that exhibits return reversals on the grant dates with a frequency 
indistinguishable from that based on randomly chosen dates. 
 
 31
We argue that while the stock return reversals are consistent with both opportunistic 
timing of information releases by firms and opportunistic timing of grant dates, these two 
methods of influencing do not completely explain the observed stock return reversals. In 
particular, we argue that the correlation between post-grant and pre-grant abnormal returns 
cannot be easily explained by these two methods of influencing alone. We propose that some 
firms may be setting the grant date on a back-date basis, i.e., choosing a grant date in the recent 
past with a lower stock price than the price on the day of the grant decision is made. If back-
date method is employed by some firms, the stock return reversals should be positively related 
to the reporting lag (the time interval between the grant date and the date on which the SEC 
receives the grant disclosure forms from the executive). We find this is indeed the case.  
The magnitude of the gains for large grants from back-dating can be significant. Our 
results show that if grant date is back-dated by 20 days, executives receiving large grants 
(500,000 shares or greater) increase the value their option compensation by about 10%. By 
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1992 940 18,409 17,304,359 126 137,336
1993 1,656 39,107 64,761,676 195 332,111
1994 2,447 33,073 80,930,643 319 253,701
1995 6,378 121,368 774,087,963 840 921,533
1996 38,775 25,805 1,000,602,029 3,521 284,181
1997 58,282 42,378 2,469,874,866 4,568 540,691
1998 58,910 38,314 2,257,102,708 4,690 481,259
1999 72,617 40,420 2,935,161,965 4,595 638,773
2000 81,541 35,217 2,871,637,746 3,826 750,559
2001 163,135 12,091 1,972,435,653 3,343 590,020
2002 120,425 10,379 1,249,847,575 2,543 491,485
Total 605,106 25,936 15,693,747,183
 
The table provides the summary statistics of 605,106 option grants reported by insiders to meet disclosure 
requirements of Section 16(a) of the Securities and Exchanges Act in firms whose returns are available in CRSP 
database. Total shares granted are the shares that the insiders will receive upon exercise of the options. Number of 




Award structure and reporting behavior by firm size and seniority of executive 























Average time from 
grant date to SEC 
receipt (calendar 
days)
< $100 million 160,845 23,423 7,676 490,803 3,767,403,546 7.65 1.84 224
Between $100 and 
$500 million 168,818 14,953 6,143 410,919 2,524,276,370 8.17 1.99 165
Between $500 and 
$3000 million 157,510 27,384 3,952 1,091,397 4,313,201,314 8.16 2.03 153
> $3000 million 117,933 43,150 1,444 3,524,145 5,088,865,953 8.55 2.20 129
Whole sample 605,106 25,936 15,693,747,183 8.11 1.98 170
Panel B: By seniority of executive 
Top executives 135,917 49,630 8,538 790,069 6,745,609,850 8.57 1.78 172
Other officers 469,189 19,071 10,677 838,076 8,948,137,333 7.97 2.01 170
Whole sample 605,106 25,936 15,693,747,183 8.11 1.98 170




Table 2 (continued) 
Panel A of the table reports the award sizes, average maturity, average time to first exercise, and average reporting lag for different firm size groups as 
measured by the market capitalization at the end of the year prior to the grant year. The sample includes 605,106 grants reported by insiders during 1992-
2002 to meet Section 16(a) requirements of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, in firms whose returns are available in Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP). Total shares granted are the shares that the insiders will receive upon exercise of the options. Number of firms indicates the firms that 
awarded options. The last column provides the average duration between the grant date and the date on which the SEC receives the filing of grant details as 
per the disclosure requirements of Section 16(a) of the Securities and Exchanges Act. Panel B provides the same data for top executives and others. Top 
executives include those with the titles (on the grant date) of Chief Executive Officers, Chairmen of the Board, Chief Financial Officers, Presidents, and 





Stock returns before and after executive  
option grants 
Holding 
period Mean CAR Median CAR
Mean raw 
return
[-90, 0] -3.26% -2.11% -2.40%
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
[-50, 0] -2.12% -1.60% -1.33%
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
[-40, 0] -1.95% -1.30% -1.47%
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
[-30, 0] -1.64% -1.05% -1.26%
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
[-20, 0] -1.05% -0.90% -0.83%
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
[-10, 0] -0.74% -0.87% -0.71%
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
[1, 10] 3.82% 1.57% 4.31%
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
[1, 20] 4.98% 2.43% 5.66%
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
[1, 30] 6.12% 3.06% 6.76%
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
[1, 40] 6.85% 3.62% 7.38%
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
[1, 50] 7.16% 4.48% 7.61%
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
[1, 90] 8.85% 6.63% 9.59%
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)  
 
The table shows mean and median cumulative abnormal returns and raw returns of stocks around the option grant 
date (day 0). The sample includes 605,106 grants reported by insiders during 1992-2002 to meet Section 16(a) 
requirements of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, in firms whose returns are available in Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Each option grant is considered as an observation. Abnormal return is 
computed as the difference between raw return and the return to value weight index of NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ stocks. Standard errors of returns are computed by averaging all returns across all events and then 
taking into account serial correlation of average abnormal returns. In parentheses are the p-values (differences 




Frequency of Abnormal Stock Return Reversals (ASRR) around the grant date 
Panel A: By firm size 
±0% ±2% ±5%
160,845 0.326 0.258 0.174
(0.257) (0.150) (0.071)
168,818 0.324 0.247 0.153
(0.258) (0.142) (0.061)
157,510 0.312 0.226 0.137
(0.256) (0.133) (0.051)
117,933 0.308 0.227 0.133
(0.257) (0.126) (0.043)
Whole sample 605,106 0.318 0.241 0.150
(0.257) (0.139) (0.057)
Threshold return
Market capitalization Number of grants
< $100 million
Between $100 and $500 
million





Panel B: By Industry 
±0% ±2% ±5%
Technology 162,516 0.379 0.325 0.231
Transportation 7,159 0.335 0.257 0.130
Consumer services 85,792 0.330 0.254 0.163
Other 38,354 0.318 0.224 0.140
Capital goods 34,226 0.297 0.208 0.121
Healthcare 103,843 0.288 0.230 0.150
Consumer nondurable 23,748 0.285 0.188 0.099
Finance 72,229 0.285 0.164 0.067
Basic Industry 23,211 0.280 0.175 0.075
Energy 18,809 0.275 0.180 0.098
Consumer durables 16,852 0.264 0.178 0.087
Public utility 18,367 0.252 0.159 0.068
Whole sample 605,106 0.318 0.241 0.150





Table 4 (continued) 
The table presents the frequency of abnormal stock return reversals (ASRR) around the option grant date (day 0) 
for different firm size groups (Panel A) and for different industries (Panel B). The sample includes 605,106 grants 
reported by insiders during 1992-2002 to meet Section 16(a) requirements of the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934, in firms whose returns are available in Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Each option grant is 
considered as an observation. Firm size is measured by the market capitalization at the end of the year prior to the 
grant year. To qualify as an ASRR, both the CAR in the interval [−9, 0] and the CAR in the interval [1, 10] should 
exceed specified thresholds. Three different definitions of ASRR are used based on three threshold returns (±0%, 
±2%, and ±5%) for both the pre-grant and post-grant CAR. The figures in the brackets in Panel A are estimated 
expected values of ASRR using a bootstrapping method. The data in Panel B is ordered by the ASRR frequency 




Determinants of abnormal stock return reversals (ASRR) around the grant date 
Threshold return Intercept Log (shares granted) Log (firm size) Rank dummy
Schedule 
dummy
Predicted sign + − + −
±0% -0.6150 0.0261 -0.0193 0.0633 -0.0535
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
±2% -0.8366 0.0502 -0.0420 0.0678 -0.0254
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.063)
±5% -1.0803 0.0704 -0.0658 0.0790 -0.0422
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.074)
p = a0 + a1 Log(shares granted) + a2 Log(firm size) + a3 Rank dummy + a4 Schedule dummy
 
The table provides the results of a probit regression with the dependent variable as the probability of abnormal 
stock return reversal (ASRR) around the grant date (day 0). The sample includes 605,106 grants reported by 
insiders during 1992-2002 to meet Section 16(a) requirements of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, in 
firms whose returns are available in Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). All options awarded to 
executives of the same firm on a given day are grouped as a single grant, resulting in a total of 65,760 
observations. To qualify as an ASRR, both the CAR in the interval [−9, 0] and the CAR in the interval [1, 10] 
should exceed specified thresholds. Three different definitions of ASRR are used based on three threshold returns 
(±0%, ±2%, and ±5%) for both the pre-grant and post-grant CAR. Log (shares granted) is the log of the total 
number of shares all insiders of the same firm who were awarded options on a given date will receive upon 
exercise of the options. Log (firm size) is the log of the market capitalization at the end of the year preceding the 
grant year. The Rank Dummy equals 1 if at least one top executive received an award on a given grant date, and 0 
otherwise; top executives include those with the titles (on the grant date) of Chief Executive Officers, Chairmen of 
the Board, Chief Financial Officers, Presidents, and Officer-Directors. The Schedule Dummy equals 1 if at least 
one insider has been granted options in the same calendar month the previous year (scheduled awards), and 0 





Relation between pre- and post- grant returns 

















10 [-90, -81] 0.0529 0.0050 -0.0060 0.0161 -0.0023 0.0046 1.38%
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0394) (0.1943)
50 [-90, -81] 0.2119 0.0076 -0.0188 0.0308 0.0107 0.0170 2.00%
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.035)
90 [-90, -81] 0.2993 0.0087 -0.0255 0.0380 0.0179 0.0327 2.06%
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0022)
10 [-50, -41] 0.0529 0.0050 -0.0060 0.0161 -0.0023 0.0012 1.38%
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0405) (0.7014)
50 [-50, -41] 0.2125 0.0075 -0.0189 0.0308 0.0109 -0.0109 2.00%
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0049)
90 [-50, -41] 0.2998 0.0087 -0.0255 0.0380 0.0180 0.0141 2.05%
 (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.9019)
10 [-10, -1] 0.0549 0.0049 -0.0061 0.0158 -0.0020 -0.0488 1.57%
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0814) (<0.0001)
50 [-10, -1] 0.2142 0.0074 -0.0189 0.0305 0.0111 -0.0486 2.04%
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
90 [-10, -1] 0.3022 0.0086 -0.0256 0.0376 0.0185 -0.0539 2.08%
 (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)





Table 6 (continued) 
The table provides the results of a regression with the different post-grant date (day 0) CAR as the dependent variable. The sample includes 605,106 grants 
reported by insiders during 1992-2002 to meet Section 16(a) requirements of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, in firms whose returns are available in 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). All options awarded to executives of the same firm on a given day are grouped as a single grant, resulting in a 
total of 65,760 observations. Abnormal return is computed as the difference between raw return and the return to value weight index of NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ stocks. The CAR is measured over three different time intervals: [1, 10], [1, 50], and [1,90], where time is measured in days and Day 0 is the grant 
date. The independent variables include Log (shares granted), Log (firm size), Rank Dummy, Schedule Dummy, and pre-grant date CAR. Log (shares 
granted) is the log of the total number of shares all insiders of the same firm who were awarded options on a given date will receive upon exercise of the 
options. Log (firm size) is the log of the market capitalization at the end of the year preceding the grant year. The Rank Dummy equals 1 if at least one top 
executive received an award on a given grant date, and 0 otherwise; top executives include those with the titles (on the grant date) of Chief Executive 
Officers, Chairmen of the Board, Chief Financial Officers, Presidents, and Officer-Directors. The Schedule Dummy equals 1 if at least one insider has been 
granted options in the same calendar month the previous year (scheduled awards), and 0 otherwise. Pre-grant CAR is measured over three different intervals: 





Frequency of Abnormal Stock Return Reversals (ASRR) for different reporting lags 
±0% ±2% ±5% ±0% ±2% ±5% ±0% ±2% ±5%
0 − 25 135,147 0.283 0.217 0.115 89,030 0.292 0.226 0.120 46,117 0.265 0.200 0.106
26 − 125 228,868 0.319 0.235 0.150 153,939 0.342 0.254 0.161 74,929 0.271 0.197 0.127
> 126 241,091 0.338 0.259 0.170 168,862 0.348 0.268 0.178 72,229 0.313 0.236 0.153
Whole sample 605,106 0.318 0.241 0.150 411,831 0.334 0.254 0.159 193,275 0.285 0.212 0.132
Number of 
grants
Threshold return Number of 
grants
Threshold returnThreshold returnNumber of 
grants





The table presents the frequency of abnormal stock return reversals (ASRR) around the option grant date (date 0) for different reporting lags. The sample 
includes 605,106 grants reported by insiders during 1992-2002 to meet Section 16(a) requirements of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, in firms 
whose returns are available in Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Each option grant is considered as an observation. To qualify as an ASRR, both 
the CAR in the interval [−9, 0] and the CAR in the interval [1, 10] should exceed specified thresholds. Three different definitions of ASRR are used based on 
three threshold returns (±0%, ±2%, and ±5%) for both the pre-grant and post-grant CAR. The reporting lag is the duration in calendar days between the grant 
date and the date of filing with the SEC. Results for the whole sample and the subsamples of scheduled and unscheduled awards are reported. An award is 




Effect of reporting lag on probability of abnormal stock return  
reversals (ASRR) around the grant date 
Panel A: Whole sample (N = 65,760) 
















sign + − + − + +
±0% -0.7420 0.0263 -0.0169 0.0623 -0.0490 0.0985 0.1425
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
±2% -0.9570 0.0503 -0.0399 0.0667 -0.0209 0.1012 0.1348
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.1261) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
±5% -1.1950 0.0704 -0.0642 0.0776 -0.0381 0.1147 0.1270
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0156) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
p = a0 + a1 Log(shares granted) + a2 Log(firm size) + a3 Rank Dummy + a4 Schedule Dummy
 
Panel B: Unscheduled awards only (N = 51,391) 














sign + − + + +
±0% -0.7870 0.0281 -0.0156 0.0648 0.1106 0.1520
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
±2% -0.9942 0.0526 -0.0403 0.0729 0.1122 0.1502
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
±5% -1.2146 0.0690 -0.0630 0.0893 0.1094 0.1263
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)





Table 8 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Scheduled awards only (N = 14,369) 














sign + − + + +
±0% -0.6404 0.0189 -0.0206 0.0556 0.0572 0.1114
(<0.0001) (0.0037) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0586) (0.0002)
±2% -0.8529 0.0401 -0.0373 0.0463 0.0662 0.0810
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0419) (0.0119)
±5% -1.1862 0.0774 -0.0676 0.0355 0.1340 0.1290
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0215) (0.0005) (0.0007)
p = a0 + a1 Log(shares granted) + a2 Log(firm size) + a3 Rank Dummy
 
 
Panel A of the table provides the results of a probit regression with the dependent variable as the probability of 
abnormal stock return reversal (ASRR) around the option grant date (day 0). The sample includes 605,106 grants 
reported by insiders during 1992-2002 to meet Section 16(a) requirements of the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934, in firms whose returns are available in Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). All options awarded 
to executives of the same firm on a given day are grouped as a single grant, resulting in a total of 65,760 
observations. To qualify as an ASRR, both the CAR in the interval [−9, 0] and the CAR in the interval [1, 10] 
should exceed specified thresholds. Three different definitions of ASRR are used based on three threshold returns 
(±0%, ±2%, and ±5%) for both the pre-grant and post-grant CAR. Log (shares granted) is the log of the total 
number of shares all insiders of the same firm who were awarded options on a given date will receive upon 
exercise of the options. Log (firm size) is the log of the market capitalization at the end of the year preceding the 
grant year. The Rank Dummy equals 1 if at least one top executive received an award on a given grant date, and 0 
otherwise; top executives include those with the titles (on the grant date) of Chief Executive Officers, Chairmen of 
the Board, Chief Financial Officers, Presidents, and Officer-Directors. The Schedule Dummy equals 1 if at least 
one insider has been granted options in the same calendar month the previous year (scheduled awards), and 0 
otherwise. The reporting lag is the duration in calendar days between the grant date and the date of filing with the 
SEC. We use the shortest of the reporting lags for grants by a firm on a given day. Report Lag2 Dummy equals 1 if 
the reporting lag is in the range [26 days, 125 days] and Report Lag3 equals 1 if the reporting lag is greater than 
125 days. Panels B and C repeat the probit regression for subsamples of unscheduled and scheduled awards, 






















Raw Returns Market-Adjusted Returns
  
 Figure 1 
 Stock returns around grant date of stock options 
The figure plots the both raw and market-adjusted abnormal stock returns around the option grant date (day 0). 
Market-adjusted abnormal return is computed as the difference between raw return and the return to value-






































 Figure 2 
 Stock return behavior around grant dates for different sub-periods 
The figure plots market-adjusted abnormal stock returns around the option grant date (day 0) for three sub 
periods: 1992-94 (N = 5,043), 1995-96 (N = 45,153), and post 1996 (N = 554,910). Market-adjusted 
abnormal return is computed as the difference between raw return and the return to value-weighted index 
































Vol 1 Vol 2 Vol 3 Vol 4 Vol 5
 
 Figure 3 
 Effect of grant size on stock return behavior around grant dates  
The figure plots market-adjusted abnormal stock returns around the option grant date (day 0) for five 
different groups based on grant size. Vol 1 represents option grants for less than 1000 shares (N = 
141,771); Vol 2 represents grants between 1001 and 10,000 shares (N = 270,561); Vol 3 represents grants 
between 10,001 and 100,000 shares (N = 167,801); Vol 4 represents grants between 100,001 and 500,000 
shares (N = 22,398); and Vol 5 represents grants greater than 500,000 shares (N = 2,575). Market-
adjusted abnormal return is computed as the difference between raw return and the return to value-

































Effect of executive rank on stock return behavior around grant dates 
The figure plots market-adjusted abnormal stock returns around the option grant date (day 0) for top 
executives (N = 135,917) and other executives (N = 469,189). Top executives include those with the titles 
(on the grant date) of Chief Executive Officers, Chairmen of the Board, Chief Financial Officers, 
Presidents, and Officer-Directors. Market-adjusted abnormal return is computed as the difference 






























Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4
 
 Figure 5 
 Effect of firm size on stock return behavior around grant dates  
The figure plots market-adjusted abnormal stock returns around the option grant date (day 0) for four 
different groups based on firm size defined as the market capitalization at the end of the year preceding 
the grant year. Size 1 represents market capitalizations less than $100 million (N = 160,845); Size 2 
represents market capitalizations between $100 million and $500 million (N = 168,818); Size 3 represents 
market capitalizations between $500 million and $3000 million (N = 157,510); and Size 4 represents 
market capitalizations greater than $3000 million (N = 117,933). Market-adjusted abnormal return is 
computed as the difference between raw return and the return to value-weighted index of NYSE, AMEX 


































 Figure 6 
Effect of scheduling awards on stock return behavior around grant dates 
The figure plots market-adjusted abnormal stock returns around the option grant date (day 0) for 
scheduled (N = 193,275) and unscheduled awards (N = 411,831). If at least one manager has been granted 
options in the same calendar month the previous year, then the award is classified as “Scheduled”, 
otherwise, the award is classified as “Unscheduled.” Market-adjusted abnormal return is computed as the 








































Stock returns around reporting date of stock options 
The figure plots market-adjusted abnormal stock returns around the day that the SEC receives the filing 
of grant information from insiders (day 0). Market-adjusted abnormal return is computed as the difference 
between raw return and the return to value-weighted index of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. 
 
